Blog (29)

Friday, 27 March 2015 00:00

Daily Journal 2015 Meeting Notes

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Daily Journal Annual Meeting Notes                                                                                        March 25, 2015


**Please note that I have tried to make these quotes as accurate as possible but they may not be verbatim


DJCO software business

Prospects look about as good as they have in a long time.  If successful much bigger maker - over the whole country.

Hard business but if we succeed this might it harder for people to come in and compete with us.

Darwinian Wisdom -  One business dying and so they try something new,  Must companies doing this will fail.  It's normal for companies to fail due to technological change.

He said while discussing activist investors that it can't be good for civilization. 

I know no wise (or successful) person who doesn't read a lot.  People who multitask are paying a huge price.  Concentration of thought is hard but it's a critical to possess.  I succeeded because I have a long attention span and can tune everything out.  Any success was due to thinking hard and following through.

World will be harder over next 50 years

Japan's position has changed because their competition (S. Korea, China) got better which is why they economy has declined.

MidAmerican is trying to do the right thing for everyone.  Think it's almost a no brainer as far as its likelihood of success.

Buying WFC at $8 was shooting fish in an empty barrel (Charlie had earlier used an analogy that he liked to find situations where the decisions were easy, like shooting fish in a barrel drained of water.)

Lee Kuan Yew most important nation builder in history of the world.  He was very rational and turned a swamp into a country while eliminating bribes, a most admirable man (Charlie also mentioned a plan to commission a bronze statue of him).

Damn near impossible to get wealthy in large cap stocks.  People who invest will be looking in more restricted/lower followed areas.  Not enough to buy quality companies because quality is priced in.

Elon Musk is a genius.

Others try to be smart I just try not to do anything idiotic.

3G using zero cost based budget system.

Casinos and lotteries are not beneficial to society.

 The desire to get rich quickly is dangerous.

While in a general discuss about ITT and its accounting issues he mentioned that Valeant's is doing much the same.

Tuesday, 25 November 2014 00:00

Zero to One

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Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future by Peter Thiel with Blake Masters

I had reservations about this book because, while it was highly recommended, my primary reason for reading the book was the hope that it might contain some useful perspective on common stock investing.  The book is primarily focused on venture capital, not an area that holds a high level of interest to me so I was pleasantly surprised when the first paragraph of the book contained a question that hooked me.    The question was one of the author’s favorite interview questions:  “What important truth do very few people agree with you on?”
The question  was an easy one for me to answer as most people believe in diversification, but the truth is the opposite, i.e. portfolio concentration.  Too many funds practice a high level of diversification that essentially makes them index funds with much higher fees.
This will be an unconventional blog post as most of the items I quote from the book speak for themselves.
p. 13: “The first step to thinking clearly is to question what we know about the past.”

I'm always surprised that most investing books don't discuss investing history.   If you don't take the time to understand  historical markets movements you put yourself in a bad position because you will have a much harder time understanding market cycles.  The low point of cycles when everyone else is afraid to invest is the ideal time to make outstanding investments.

p. 21: What does the author say the lessons of the internet bubble were?

1.    It is better to risk boldness than triviality.
2.    A bad plan is better than no plan.
3.    Competitive markets destroy profits.
4.    Sales matters just as much as product.

p.23: “The most contrarian thing of all is not to oppose the crowd but to think for yourself.”

p.24: “Under perfect competition, in the long run no company makes an economic profit.  The opposite of perfect competition is monopoly.

p.25-35: He defines a monopoly as”…the kind of company that’s so good at what it does that no other firm can offer a close substitute.”
“If you want to create and capture lasting value, don’t build an undifferentiated commodity business.”

p.25:  This in investing terms would change only slightly to don’t buy an undifferentiated commodity business.

Decline of Monopolies

p.33: "...old monopolies don't strangle innovation.  With Apple's iOS at the forefront, the rise of mobile computing has dramatically reduced Microsoft's decades-long operating system dominance."  He talks about IBM, AT&T also eventually declined.  Even the best monopolies have finite lives.

p.34: "All happy companies are different: each one earns a monopoly by solving a unique problem.  All failed companies are the same: they failed to escape competition."

p.47: "If you focus on near-term growth above all else, you miss the most important question you should be asking:  will this business still be around a decade from now?  Numbers alone won't tell you the answer; instead you must think critically about the qualitative characteristics of your business."

p. 48:  Monopoly Traits:

1. Proprietary technology:  "...most substantive advantage a company can have because it makes your product difficult or impossible to replicate.  Mentions Google's algorithms and that your product needs to be 10X better.  Amazon had 10x inventory.

2. Network Effects
Product is more useful as more people use it.  He believes that to be successful with this strategy you must start in a small market.

3. Economies of Scale.
Monopoly business gets stronger as they get bigger.  Can spread costs out.

4. Branding
Used Apple as an example - "paid advertising, branded stores, luxurious materials, playful keynote speeches.    Reinforces other monopoly traits.

Power Law p.87: "At Founders Fund, we focus on five to seven companies in a fund, each of which we think could become a multibillion-dollar business based on its unique framework  Whenever you shift from the substance of a business to the financial question of whether or not it fits into a diversified hedging strategy, venture investing starts to look a lot like buying lottery tickets.  And once you think that you're playing the lottery, you've already psychologically prepared yourself to lose."
What an excellent quote and advice that I wish more people will follow.  Investors should approach investing in a rational serious manner which in a perfect world would allow them to make the optimal investment decisions based on the companies available that they can understand and value.

p. 90: "The most common answer to the question of future value is a diversified portfolio: "Don't put all your eggs in one basket...  investors who understand the power law make as few investments as possible."
The author is involved with venture capital an area where the accepted wisdom is to diversify your portfolio, much like what you hear as an accepted truth in the equity investing world.  In his fun he tries to purchase companies that "..have the potential to be succeed at vast scale."  The only thing I would add from an equity investing standpoint is that valuation must also play a role in your decision making process.

To wrap this blog post up I have to say that I really enjoyed the book and would have no problem recommending it to followers of the blog.

Thursday, 25 September 2014 00:00

Book Update, WEB, & Adam Smith

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Book Update, WEB, & Adam Smith


Book Update

The 2nd edition of The Focus Investor will be published on or about December 10th.  I had delayed publishing the book hoping that the investing book market would recover but a recent health issue convinced me to move forward.  The cover has been designed and I'm working on the final drafts of the book now with my editor so that we can then forward on the material to my book designer.

Here is the Amazon link to the pre-order:

Amazon Book Link


Lessons From WEB and Gladwell

Once again Warren has allowed Fortune magazine to print an excerpt from his next annual letter to shareholders.  (Link:  This blog post  is inspired by that letter and the most recent book by Malcolm Gladwell, David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and The Art of Battling Giants.

Let's first look at the excerpt from  Mr. Buffett's annual letter.  In the excerpt he describes two investments in fields outside common stocks.  The common theme of both investments was that he was able to take advantage of low prices because the real estate environment was depressed after bubbles had burst.  This is a simple lesson, but one that I'm always surprised that isn't acted upon by most investors, i.e., when the situation is dark and stormy in the markets is when investors will have above average chances of finding investment opportunities to take advantage of.  Understanding the history of financial bubbles so that you can take advantage of similar situations that will occur in the future is a major focus of my book, The Focus Investor.

Another piece of  investment advice he mentioned in the article connected with the Gladwell book I'm currently reading.  The quote was:

"Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time.  Indeed it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important."

In one chapter of Mr. Gladwell's book, he examines the basketball coaching career of Vivek Ranadive's.  Ranadive decided to coach his daughters seventh-and-eighth grade basketball team despite never having played basketball .  In fact during the few times he had watched a basketball game he couldn't understand why both teams let players get to the half court line unimpeded each time.  His team  was average, at best, so he developed a plan that would provide his team with a needed advantage, they would  " a real full-court press - every game, all the time".  This strategy caused so much havoc that the team was able to compile a winning record that lead them  into the final game in their league national championship series.  Along the way Ranadive noticed that opposing coaches began to get angry because he wasn't playing the game in the correct manner and one person tried to initiate a fight with him in a parking lot.

This is the same lesson Warren talks about in his letters, just because diversification is preached as main-stream gospel, doesn't mean it's the right strategy for investors to follow.  Just because someone appears on television doesn't make them an expert in investing and that you should act upon their suggestions.  In fact I think most of the topics of conversation on CNBC are pure drivel and are actually dangerous for an investor to focus on because so much of it is short-term orientated.

Another example from Gladwell's site highlights why I built this site in the first place.  Focus, or concentrated investing, is looked at with suspicion in the mainstream investment community and in academia as well.  Gladwell highlights how Manet, Degas, Cezanne, Monet, Pissarro, and Renior - all names that are immediately recognizable today even if you're not an art collector, at the beginning stages of their careers where shunned by the established art intuitions of the day.  The institutions treated their work with contempt and even when they happened to pick one of their pieces to display they would display them in the least visible areas.

The painters (known as the Impressionists) had a completely different interpretation of what art should be that didn't match with what the establishment thought was fine art.  They decided to hold their own show where they didn't have to abide by the conventional painting rules with an additional benefit being that their art wouldn't get lost in the hundreds of painting in the main show,    "We are beginning to make ourselves a niche, " a hopeful Pissarro wrote to a friend. "We have succeeded as intruders in setting up our little banner in the midst of the crowd."   As history has shown their approach certainly was successful.

One of the key lessons to learn from both Buffett and Gladwell  (and expressed so well in the following quote by Gladwell) is that sometimes the "...apparent disadvantage of being an outsider in a marginal world turns out not to be a disadvantage at all."  I certainly have seen that over and over in my professional career.

 Adam Smith


George Goodman, who wrote under the pseudonym  Adam Smith, passed away this year.  In this short remembrance on Mr. Smith Jason Zweig wrote that  Mr. Buffett considered him to be "...the second-best writer ever to explain how the investment business works, after the brilliant Fred Schwed, whose Where Are the Customers' Yachts? remains the finest - and funniest - book on Wall Street ever written."

Buffett went on to say that he thought his first book, The Money Game, was "incredibly insightful."

Here is a quote from the 1968 version of The Money Game (p. 81) that I think fits in with the overall discussion in this blog post:

"If you are automatically applying a mechanical formula, then you are operating in this area of intuition, and if you are going to operate with intuition - or judgment - then it follows that the first thing you have to know is yourself.  You are - face it - a bunch of emotions, prejudices, and twitches, and this is all very well as long as you know it....  A series of market decisions does add up, believe it or not, to a kind of personality portrait.  It is, in one small way, a method of finding out who you are, but it can be very expensive.  That is one of the cryptograms which are my own, and this is the first Irregular Rule:  If you don't know who you are, this is an expensive place to find out."

Stay focused!

Saturday, 05 October 2013 00:00

Lou Simpson 2013 Speech Notes

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Lou Simpson Speech at Ohio Wesleyan 10/3/2013

Speech Title: Corporate America: To Rent or Own?

Please note that I’ve tried my best to come as close as possible to what Mr. Simpson said during his speech but I only took notes and did not conduct a word for word transcription.
When looking for companies to buy determine if they care about long-term profits as a lot of forces make CEOs focus on short-term.
1. Most CEOs are focused on empire building. Bigger is more important. M&A record is mediocre at best with a good percentage of them result in value destruction. They get paid more as business gets bigger. Some CEOs are just deal jockeys.

2. CEOs are focused on short-term EPS and revenue growth. When CEOs say to him that an action they wish to take will create value he tells them that they need to create value on a per-share basis.

3. Lots of noise and self promotion in terms of executives on CNBC and attending conferences where they try to sell stock like selling pizza. “If you do a good job running the company the investors will find you.” He thinks you will only find people who want to rent your stock by attending conferences and that you will get a better class of shareholders by running the business in the right manner.

4. Accounting issues. Lots of noise in earnings, GAAP is meaningless as a result of continuous one time charges. He prefers to focus on the cash flow statement.
Good businesses, those earning a good return on capital, low capex, and can invest cash flow or give it to shareholders in efficient manner.
What are good uses of cash?

1. Increase Dividends
2. Buy stock below intrinsic value
3. Pile up cash (generally not smart)
4. Reivest in current business which should be first priority.

Focus on companies looking to buy back stock.

What really bothers him is when CEO and senior management own no stock. Options and restricted stock do not count. He feels they shouldn’t receive stock if all they do is sell it and not become owners.
He told a story about a company that recently did a bond offering. Buying back stock like crazy. Lou and CEO are the only ones who own lots of stock. He is chairman of the compensation committee (I’m fairly certain this is Verisign which is a company I own).

Other Management Issues
1. Lots of turnover. Pressure on CEOs to hit home run right away. HP is example of a company that gone to outsiders for management and it has been a disaster. He said it was once a great company and who know maybe Meg Whitman can turn it around.
2. Wall street focuses on company earning numbers and exceeding guidance expectations. He stated he is not a fan of guidance. He didn’t say this but my impression was that CEOs pay too much attention to Wall Street and this is one reason for their short-term focus.

Root of the problem is instant gratification. An example is mutual funds in that they advertise short-term performance. People who buy mutual funds are even worse as they focus on hot funds. At this point he spoke highly of Peter Lynch’s track record as a fund manager and commented even so most of the investors in the fund lost money by buying high and selling low.

Most investors are greedy when they should be fearful and vice versa.

He recommended the book The Outsiders by William Thorndike. The book should people who thought like owners and were able to create a lot of value. The place he is still on the board sent the book to everyone (board and senior management). As I mentioned before I believe he is referring to Verisign.

How to invest:

1. Try to find fine businesses
2. Try to find businesses that could be run by idiots
3. Find people running company that think like long-term owners
4. Find businesses that reinvest back in the business when necessary
5. Willing to send excess cash to shareholders in most efficient manner
6. Find people who are tying to grow long-term value on a per-share basis.
7. Managers who own stock (said he looks very carefully at the proxy statement)
8. Look carefully at compensation structure
9. Culture is very important but management must not just talk it, they must live it.

Q&A Session

(The microphone was not working properly so I was unable to write down the questions asked)

He replied that options have a place but need a longer time horizon. Spoke against option repricing.

He replied in response to a question that corporate America is over-regulated and its hurting America even though we still overcome this issue.

Tuesday, 13 August 2013 18:31

Moneyball: The Intelligent Investor for the Masses?

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Moneyball, the book and the movie, contain all sorts of important lessons and both have struck a chord with its audience and have both been positively received but outside of the investment world I would imagine most watchers of the movie have no idea how well it represents what money managers like myself try to accomplish in our search for investment opportunities.

The focus of the story is how the Oakland A's managed to win 91 games in 2000 and 102 games in 2001 while only spending $26 million for 27 players in 2000 and $34 million for 28 players in 2001. The Yankees in comparison won 87 games in 2000 and 95 in 2001 while paying $85.1 million on 26 player salaries 2000 and $116.3 million for 29 players in 2001 (Information sourced by Another way to look at this data is that Oakland paid $285, 714 per win in 2000 while the Yankees spent $978,160. It wouldn't take a value investor much longer than a few seconds to determine who created more value. Mr. Lewis echoed this on p. 288 "...some baseball executives seemed to be much better than others at getting wins out of dollars."

Value investors also look for opportunities in the market where value and price have diverged. This was just what Billy Beane and the A's where doing as explained by Mr. Lewis in the book preface:
"...set about looking for inefficiencies in the game. In what amounted to a systematic scientific investigation of their sport, the Oakland front office has reexamined everything from the market price of foot speed to the inherent difference between the average major league player and the superior Triple-A one. That's how they found their bargains."

While we conduct the same process in investing luckily there are many more companies than teams in MLB so in most periods, if you dig long enough, you will find a company that is misunderstood in the market. This one element, the misunderstanding or misjudgment of talent and companies, is vitally important to any successful baseball general manager and investor.

Another lesson gleaned from Moneyball is that it takes a combination of looking at the raw numbers (stats in baseball, quantitative analysis in investing) and evaluating the rest of the picture. The perfect illustration of this in the book is when Paul DePodesta is examining player stats and discovered a player, David Beck, while looking over a pitcher who was a consensus first round draft pick. Paul looked over the others pitchers on that team and discovered that Beck actually had better stats then the consensus first round pick. Paul asked the scouts to look at him and the scouts eventually told him that the pitcher was a "soft tosser", scout code for someone not worth looking at. Later the situation changed and the head of scouting decided to draft the player without ever having seen him throw a pitch.

The reason Beck had been undrafted soon became apparent when they saw him pitch. They saw " of the most bizarre sights any of them had ever seen on a pitcher's mound. When the kid drew back his left arm to throw, his left hand flopped and twirled maniacally..." All the other scouts had ignored Beck because he didn't pitch the way everyone else did, he was different. A parallel in the investing world was when investors bailed out of Warren Buffett's company, Berkshire Hathaway, during the internet bubble because he wouldn't invest when everyone one was investing in overpriced technology stocks and making "easy money".

What's interesting is that David Beck ended up not making it to the big leagues. In this case it seems the numbers alone didn't tell the whole story. It's like finding a company with great fundamental numbers lead by a management team that has horrible capital allocation skills. To be really successful you have to find a player or company that has the complete package.

In the following section I highlight several sections that contain important lessons and talk about how they are also relevant to the investing world.

Quote 1: "..the point is not to have the highest on-base percentage, but to win games as cheaply as possible. And the way to win games cheaply is to buy the qualities in a baseball player that the market undervalues, and sell the ones that the market overvalues."

Investing Lesson: One of the most basic lessons in investing. You must buy when others are selling. This sounds obvious and easy but when these opportunities become available the company will likely be facing a difficult short-term situation. You will also be hard pressed to find anyone positive about the company (or the market in certain situations) and most people find it had to align themselves against the consensus view of any given particular situation.

Quote 2: "For Billy and Paul, and, to a slightly lesser extent, Erik and Chris, a young player is not what he looks like, or what he might become, but what he has done." (p. 38)

Investing Lesson: An investor should examine a company's past performance and use it as a guide to the quality of the business first and then form their own impressions of the quality of the company's future franchise. This is not a hard and fast rule for companies as occasionally one that hasn't performed well historically can turn the corner under a new management team or one that discovered the flaws in their business model. One such company is Verisign. The company came to understand its acquisition strategy had failed to create long-term value and changed course by selling them off, reinvesting back in their core business, paying special dividends, and buying back stock.

Quote 3: The book is talking about the oldest scout in the room named Boogie. He had been sent to scout Billy Beane and said "Billy was a guy you could dream on." (p.42)

Investing Lesson: You shouldn't make a stock purchase based solely on high expectations or because the company, while currently not profitable, is projected to have incredible growth, margins and future prospects. You have to form reasonable expectations and only make an investment when the price of the security and your expectations meet. You conclusions may not be the same view that is held by the "street" but don't let that deter you.

Quote 4: Paul DePodesta, "You know what gets me excited about a guy? I get excited about a guy when he has something about him that causes everyone else to overlook him and I know that it is something that does not matter." (p. 116)

Investing Lesson: The best investments usually are found in areas where others don't understand the value equation or are overweighting an negative issue the company is dealing with. Reis is one company that comes to mind that found itself mired in just such a situation. The company had two divisions, one had been performing very well and the other was in run-off mode but had an outstanding liability present in the form of a lawsuit. Even after the lawsuit was settled there was a period of time where the situation still was not widely understood and thus the stock remained undervalued.

Quote 5: Paul DePodesta. He and Michael Lewis are in the film room watching the New York Yankees take it to the A's. Michael is getting fired up because the A's are not playing well and the Yankees have been taking advantage of that with a good deal of success and nobody else in the film room is showing any reaction. Paul says "It's looking at process rather than outcomes. Too many people make decisions based on outcomes rather than process. It's not what happened it's how our guy approached it." (p. 146)

Investing Lesson: You will not be right about every investment you make. The key is to do the develop a process that includes conducting a thorough review of the company, purchase it an price far enough below your estimate of its intrinsic value that you have a margin of safety and have the discipline and patience to wait until others also recognize the value. If you finally conclude your have made a mistake don't stall on making the sale, do it and figure out what went wrong in your decision process.

Quote 6: Scott Hatteberg is in the film room reviewing tape of a pitcher he has not had much luck hitting against. "...Hatteberg considers why everyone doesn't prepare for Jamie Moyer as he does - by watching tape, imagining what will happen, deciding what to look for, deciding what he will never swing at." (page 184)

Investing Lesson: This is another example of the disciplined process and persistence it takes to succeed in any realm of study. Scott had developed a process that helped him prepare for possible situations that he could excel at and also to see what situations he should avoid. The search discipline is the same for investing. You must understand what companies fit into your circle of competence and avoid those that are not understandable or are currently overpriced. As an investor you should always be looking for companies that fall into your circle of competence, even if they are currently overvalued, so you can watch them in case the situation changes. You should also develop an understanding of situations to avoid. Investing in IPOs is one such situation that in the vast majority of cases should be avoided. IPOs tend to be of companies that are hot in the market right now and in most cases will be sold at a premium valuation.

Quote 7: Mr. Lewis listed 5 rules used by Billy Beane when he is shopping for players. The first doesn't apply to investors but the last 4 are good rules to follow (p. 193-194):

"The day you say you have to do something, you're screwed. Because you are going to make a bad deal. You can always recover from the player you don't sign. You may never recover from the player you signed at the wrong price."

"Know exactly what every player in baseball is worth to you. You can put a dollar figure on it."

"Know exactly who you want and go after him."

" Every deal you do will be publicly scrutinized by subjective opinion. To do this well, you have to ignore the newspapers."

Investing Lesson: I think these five rules sum up the lessons from the book quite well. Price, i.e. valuation, is all important in investing just as in baseball. When you find the right company selling at the right price you need to invest a meaningful portion of your portfolio in that company. You must be able to stay investing based on your own reasoning and be able to ignore the opinions of the crowd.

Tuesday, 16 April 2013 14:43

Books and More

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Books and More...

Hello everyone! We have several topics to cover in this Blog entry so let's dive right in.

1. So far I have had three rejections while conducting my agent search for the new edition of The Focus Investor.

2. Lawrence Cunningham has published an updated version of his great reference, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America (Third Edition). The unique feature of this book is that it presents the material contained in Warren Buffett's shareholder letters by topic which makes it much easier to find what Warren has said concerning a specific topic. This book has been a valuable time saving resource for me and I would certainly recommend it to everyone.

Amazon Link

Kindle Link

3. What's Behind the Numbers?: A Guide to Exposing Financial Chicanery and Avoiding Huge Losses in Your Portfolio by John Del Vecchio and Tom Jacobs (Disclosure: I was provided a review copy by Mr. Jacobs.)

Amazon Link

Kindle Link

Summary Review:
The first thing I want to tell readers is that I really enjoyed the material in this book. It's well written and it's a book that both "professional" investors and those who do their own investment work will find insightful.

I'm always interested in learning more about forensic accounting techniques and when I saw this book on Amazon I was immediately interested. I recognized one of authors of the book right away as I had followed Mr. Jacobs career for many years dating back to his Motley Fool days. I was also intrigued when I read that Mr. Vecchio had worked for David Tice AND Dr. Howard Schilit, both legends in the forensic accounting field.

For those that haven't read the book yet it certainly covers forensic accounting, and does so using real examples in an easy to understand format, but it also contains much more. So just what is the thesis of the book? They explain it on page 19:

"With the tools in this book, investors will increase their chances of achieving high real returns by weeding out or avoiding the stocks that perform so poorly that they will ruin overall returns and possibly destroy capital permanently."

To reach this goal they advocate using an investment approach that combines a small-cap value strategy (while also participating in select special situations) with a short component.

I found their short thinking quite interesting as they state not to short companies "...based on overvaluation, fads, frauds, or poor business models" which is what I would have considered to be perfect short candidates. They instead advocate waiting until the aggressive accounting methods discussed in the book are used by companies, i.e. "wait until there are negative catalysts for profits in the near future - a year or two at most, the rough time period that the value-with-catalyst investor seeks."
The material is presently effectively with looks of real world examples that highlight the strategies that have successfully employed and investors will surely find it useful.

Detailed Review (For those blog readers who really want to get into the details):
The first chapter lays out the base case on why it's important to know what's behind the numbers and discusses a variety of topics that touch upon the psychology of investing and what pitfalls the individual investor typically make in their investing process. It highlights the importance of real returns, why it's hard for most people to follow a dollar cost averaging program and lays the foundation for their investment thesis.

I found Chapters 2-5 to be exactly what I was looking for in this book: forensic accounting techniques. Chapter 2 covered the income statement and examined such topics as aggressive revenue recognition, channel stuffing, and accounts receivables. The chapter teaches you how to spot problems and provides examples of problems they discovered and how they discovered the examples using the company's SEC filings. The remaining Chapters 3-5 also use the same format to cover other areas in the financial statements that investors can use to try and spot potential problem areas. This was the part of the book I thoroughly enjoyed and has material that every focus investor needs to be aware of to be an effective investor.

In Chapter 6 Tom develops his thesis for the long portion of the investment program the book advocates. I think focus investors will find most of his ideas to be quite consistent with the focus investing style and he is obviously heavily influenced by an excellent research paper written by Tweedy Browne: "What has Worked in Investing." My main reservation about this chapter will come as no surprise, no mention is made of portfolio concentration. Tom's approach is obviously very heavily influenced by Ben Graham who certainly did not follow a concentrated investing style. While I favor a more concentrated investing approach I can find no fault with anyone that follows the example of Mr. Graham.

The next section of the book is where the trouble begins. If you have read this blog, this site, or my book you know that I am no fan of using charts to aid in the investment decision process and since this Chapter 7 covers that topic I would recommend skipping Chapter 7.

I have the hardest time with Chapter 8 as it deals with suggestion on how to avoid "massive bear market losses." I would suggest focus investor read it as it does present several interesting indicators that investors might want to be aware of but I also want to caution focus investor practitioners to not become so focused on the subject that you get completely out of the market as people have proven time and time again that they get out when they should be buying stocks. Market timing has no place in the focus investing strategy. In fact focus investors should structure their financial situation so that they possess the ability to not only ride out bear markets but also be able to take advantage of them. This requires a different mentality and temperament and is not for everyone.

Parting Thoughts

The best part of the book dealt with forensic accounting which sections contained plenty of information that their readers can put to good use immediately. I thought they covered shorting in an interesting and compelling manner though they didn't convince me to participate. Not that I think shorting is wrong, I just don't find it appealing personally. As they mention in the book even if you don't short stocks yourself "...the short-selling expert's tools - and the shorting mindset - can lead to successful investing, simply by avoiding the statistical basement revealed by the data."
I didn't find Chapters 7 and 8 to my liking and would have to recommend skipping those sections. In my experience technical analysis and market timing are not rewarding areas for focus investors to be spending time on.
Overall I found the book to be quite interesting and think that it's certainly worth including in your investing library.

4. I found this article in the New York Times on April 12, 2013 by James Stewart, When Shareholder Democracy is Sham Democracy to be quite disturbing even though it matches the experiences I have had in the decade or so I have been involved in the investment industry. In the opening paragraph the author discusses how he thought that it was "..hard to imagine a more compelling case for ousting directors than the posed by Hewlett-Packard" and I certainly would have no argument with that as they presided over a significant level of shareholder value destruction.

Now I have seen how high the levels of shareholder atrophy is for years and Ben Graham talked about how shareholders acted like sheep back in his book, Security Analysis, written in the 30s, so this shouldn't come as a surprise that Hewlett-Packard's board members mainly survived the period of bad decision making. What the author goes on to state next did surprise me, he found 41 cases in which "...the director actually lost their elections last year, meaning that more than 50 percent of the shareholders withheld their votes of approval. Yet despite these resounding votes of no confidence, they remained at their posts."
He gives several examples of how companies are blatantly disregarding their shareholders with one example being particular egregious. Iris International had all nine of their directors nominees rejected by shareholders. They resigned as required be Delaware corporate law but they then voted to reject THEIR OWN RESIGNATIONS.

In my experience many companies, especially under performing ones, have no desire to speak with their shareholders and only do so grudgingly. Management and directors both in most cases seem to think of their shareholders as adversaries and not someone that owns part of the company. The incorporation laws in Delaware have caused the tipping point to favor management to such a large extent that shareholders are left without a voice that carries any weight. It's sad to see shareholders have such an unimportant voice in a country founded on democratic principles.

Link to article:

Friday, 15 March 2013 00:00

GEICO: An Investment Lesson

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I wrote the following article thinking that it would be part one of a larger piece on examining Mr. Buffett's early investments by paying particular attention to what was known at the time and also to see what lessons focus investors could learn from them. With the sad passing of Mr. Bynre I thought readers might enjoy this article since it deals with GEICO, which he was instrumental in saving.

GEICO: An Investment Lesson

Mr. Buffett discovered GEICO while researching his teacher at Columbia, Benjamin Graham. After learning Graham was on the board of the company he went to its office, on a weekend, and was lucky enough to find a key executive willing to educate him on the company and the insurance industry. After this education and his own further research it became clear to him that the company enjoyed a unique distribution method, direct sales to its customers, which allowed them to enjoy a cost advantage by having lower expenses than the typical agent method of distribution. He became so enamored with the company and its business model that he recommend the company to his clients while working as a broker in Omaha.

He continued to watch the company during the following decades despite having sold his stake in the 1950s. He was finally able to make a major investment in the company when the company almost derailed into bankruptcy as a result of poor underwriting and other factors in the mid 70s. This brings up a principle that I have mentioned before in my book, a key principle of focus investing: take the time to understand exceptional companies because when they hit a rough patch and the market sends the stock price into a tail spin you can quickly examine the issues and see if they are long-term or short-term in nature and act accordingly. Let's now look an overview of the history of the company and then look at Mr. Buffett's GEICO investment history to see what lessons we can take away from it to apply in our own investment operations.

The history of the company is briefly described here from the company's internet site:

"The 1960s proved to be similarly successful. GEICO experienced virtually unbroken growth, passing the 1 million policyholder mark in 1964. Insurance premiums reached $150 million in 1965. Net earnings doubled to $13 million in 1966. GEICO opened a number of sales and service offices for walk-in customers and its first drive-in claims office in 1965.

The 1970s, however, were not nearly as good to the company. At the beginning of the decade, both Leo and Lillian Goodwin passed away, and the loss of the company's founders (I would also include the passing of the leadership reins by Mr. Lorimer Davidson in 1970 when he retired as Chairman), seemed to usher in difficult times for GEICO. By the mid-70s, the years of aggressive expansion were starting to show some weaknesses in the company's loss reserves (NOTE: Unspoken here is that poor policy pricing and a declining stock market really hurt the company. In Snowball, the book by Alice Schroeder (page 889), she writes that "...the devastating stock market of 1973-74 had wiped out so much value from GEICO's stock portfolio that for every share of stock, investments that had once been worth $3.90 were now worth a dime a share". This on top of a increase in auto accident claim costs and high inflation levels pressuring their bond portfolio are just several of the challenges that combined to make it a difficult period for the company.)"

The investment story starts in 1975 when Mr. Buffett (p. 430, Snowball) stated that "I looked again at GEICO and was startled by what I saw after a few rule-of-thumb calculations about loss reserves." This was important for a simple reason, GEICO was in growth mode and had expanded from its original mandate to only insure government workers because the founders discovered that they had a lower loss rate than the general population. When in growth mode you take on lots of new customers and to get these new customers you may have to price more aggressively. Another factor to consider is that GEICO likely had no cost/lose history on these new customer lines so a natural consequence was that they would experience more losses and hence would need to keep a close eye on their reserves going forward.

Mr. Buffett continued "It was clear in a sixty-second examination that the company was far underreserved and the situation as getting worse. I went in to see [the CEO] Norm Gidden on one of my Washington Post trips. He was friendly, but he had no interest at all in listening to my comments. They were in deep denial. He really sort of hustled me out of the office and would not respond on the subject."

It didn't take long before the company had to face reality though as in early 1976 they announced a $190 million loss and to make matters worse from the viewpoint of the investment community they also announced a suspension to their dividend payments. GEICO was soon forced to seek new management and chose Jack Byrne, an insurance executive that had recently left Travelers when wasn't picked to be their next CEO.

The situation was so serious that Jack knew he would need the help of regulators so he had a meeting with Max Wallach, the District of Columbia Insurance Superintendent. After many additional meetings Mr. Wallach decided not to shut down the company but insisted that conduct a reinsurance agreement with other companies in the business and also required them to raise a slug of capital so that they could pay their claims as they came due. This was a actually a favorable result as Mr. Wallach could have chosen to shut down the company completely! Jack wasted no time in implementing his rescue plan, Operation Bootstrap, which included closing offices, slimming down the size of the work force, and exiting unprofitable markets.
Warren watched all these events transpiring and saw the stock price go into free fall. He know the company so well and for so long he thought GEICO possessed a cost advantage rarely found in an insurance company and thought that advantage would continue if the company survived. After thinking on the situation he knew that Jack Bryne had to possess a combination of gifts if he was going to succeed in his quest to right the ship. If he was going to invest in GEICO now he had to meet with him and determine if he possessed those characteristics. Warren was looking for someone who was (page 433, Snowball) ", unflappable, and professional." and who knew the insurance business inside and out. After meeting with Bryne he decided that he was the right person and started buying large amounts of GEICO common stock.

All these actions sound perfectly natural looking back on them with the advantage of time having passed and the eventual outcome being known but let's examine at what was being reported on in the news and see if you think you could have had the courage to invest then. Here is one article dated July 16, 1976 which was titled, Insurance: GEICO at the Brink[1][1]:

"Once upon a quite recent time, the staid insurance industry had a Cinderella firm called Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO). By charging low premium rates, GEICO skipped past older firms to become the fifth largest auto insurer in the land. Investors from far and wide flocked to buy a piece of GEICO, bidding its stock up to more than $60 a share. Then Cinderella turned into a pumpkin.

Today GEICO stock is selling at about $2.50 and the company is on the brink of bankruptcy. A GEICO crash would be costly to the company's 2.8 million policyholders in 25 states, who would lose some of the $660 million a year they have been paying GEICO in premiums, and to other insurers, who would have to take over payment of claims against GEICO. The company has lost $150 million since the start of 1975. Worse, Maximilian Wallach, Superintendent of Insurance in Washington, D.C., where GEICO is headquartered, seems to be failing in a rescue attempt.

Costly Pullout. For weeks Wallach has been phoning executives of other insurance companies to persuade them to reinsure 40% of GEICO'S policies and pay GEICO $26 million in cash commissions in return for a share of future premium income. He also sought their agreement to buy whatever part of a planned $75 million offering of GEICO convertible preferred stock the company's present shareholders do not purchase (shareholders must approve the offering at a meeting next week). By late June, Wallach had rounded up enough pledges to put off a deadline he had once set for moving to have GEICO declared bankrupt.

But last week State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the nation's largest auto insurer, withdrew its offer to reinsure 6% of GEICO's policies. State Farm had warned Wallach that it would carry out the agreement only if other insurers agreed to reinsure 34% of GEICO's policies by June 30. With State Farm out, it is now doubtful that other insurers can be persuaded to pump enough cash into GEICO to keep the company alive. GEICO directors are planning to offer 300,000 shares of senior preferred stock (which would have first priority on any future dividends) in case the $75 million convertible preferred issue does not sell, but who might want to buy the senior preferred—and why—is open to question."

So when did Mr. Buffett make his first investment? According to Roger Lowenstein in his book, Buffett The Making of an American Capitalist, he first bought "...500,000 shares at 2 1/8 (which only a few years earlier was trading in the low 40s) and left a standing order in the multimillions" after an extensive meeting with Jack Byrne in July 1976. So at this point he thought the company had the right CEO but the insurance commissioner still needed to be convinced not to take over the company and the reinsurance program and equity raise mentioned earlier needed to be worked out.

I think he made the investment, and was comfortable with his decision, because he knew that Max Wallach, by insisting that the company coordinate a reinsurance program with other insurance companies, didn't seem to want to kill the company. He also knew that he would be willing to contribute to the reinsurance program required by the insurance commissioner (Later he did participate in the reinsurance program and during an subsequent equity raise, he advised the investment banker he would be willing to serve as the sole provider of the capital if he was forced to). In short he had a unique perspective and an in-depth knowledge of the insurance industry that many investors would not have had the benefit of when they tried to determine if the company would make a good investment. Investing during these periods is not easy as is evident in a comment Mr. Buffett made a comment at a Washington Post board meeting: "I've just invested in something that might go under. I could lose the entire investment next week". (page 198, Buffett: The Making of an American Capitalist)

How did the investment situation work out? No more than two months after Mr. Buffett made his initial investment the company completed its preferred stock offering with Mr. Buffett purchasing a large chunk of it. This offering essentially meant that the company was certain to survive its troubles. The common stock responded to the change in the situation by jumping to 8 1/8. Mr. Buffett kept investing and over the next couple of years he doubled his stake in the company.

I think focus investors, though unlikely to have been able to invest as early as Mr. Buffett due to his unique understanding and access to the company, would have been able make a profitable investment even after the clouds had cleared over the company. Learn to take the long-term view, avoid rear-view mirror investing, and if the underlying business are intact you can make very profitable investments even after the clouds have cleared because the investment community at large will take time to believe the company turnaround is real.

[1] Link:,9171,914339,00.html

Tuesday, 11 December 2012 00:00

The Outsiders

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The Focus Investor Book 2nd Edition

The book revamp/rewrite/improvements are done. The next step is trying to find an agent or someone to publish it. Keep your fingers crossed! If the book doesn't find a publisher I'm looking at electronic publishing options.

Book Review: The Outsiders by William Thorndike

Amazon Link

Amazon Kindle Link

Focus investors are always searching for those companies that have exceptional competitive advantages but the investment research process doesn't end when they are found. To earn outsized investment returns two other necessary components need to be present:

1. The company needs to be selling below its intrinsic value
2. The company must also possess management that understands how to properly allocate capital.

Management capital allocation skills can then become the determining factor on what kinds of investment returns the shareholders will receive. Management can sink investment returns by squandering excess cash by making bad acquisitions, failing to buy back stock at appropriate prices, and not taking advantage of tax efficiencies.

The Outsiders is of my favorite investment books of the year because it examines how excess returns can be created by a management team that approaches their job differently than most CEOs. It's well written, it has clear historical examples, in short there is a lot of lessons to learn, and apply, to a focused investment program.

What's the key insight to the book? Warren Buffett once related that the institutional imperative was a force in business that he never learned at business school. Well I've been in the investment industry now over ten years and I can say with confidence that the institutional imperative is alive in well both in the investment business and at the companies I follow. This book shows you how talented management team can break free of the institutional mindset and create real shareholder value!

It's rare to find a manager willing to differentiate themselves from Wall Street and not follow the normal Wall Street line. For instance many CEOs have to devote a large portion of their time meeting with money managers simply because most money managers won't even invest in their company if they don't speak with them. I'm sure the vast majority of this time could be better used by the CEOS instead of them having to deal with money managers trying to get a direction of next quarter's earnings or "advising" the management team of short-term behavior that might boost the stock price.

In a recent Wall Street Journal article (Investors Demand CEO Face Time, Nov. 29, 2012)the CEO of Gamestop said that "... investors and analysts take up an ever-larger chunk of his schedule. He estimates he now spends 25% to 30% of his time preparing for or attending meetings at the company's Grapevine, Texas, headquarters or investor hubs like New York, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco."

So finding a management team that can resist this institutional imperative is quite rare. To find one that takes the next step into the type of superior capital allocation as Mr. Thorndike discusses in his book is even rare but if they can be identified they can add lots of value to your investment portfolio over time.

Everyone reading this blog is familiar with Warren Buffett and he is featured in the book (along with other luminaries as Tom Murphy, Henry Singleton and Kay Graham , to just name a few) ins lauded for having created an incredible capital compounding machine at Berkshire but how many managers follow his example? Not many.

Do I know of any management teams that are following the formula described in the book? Well I would say Verisign since 2007 has followed quite a few aspects displayed by managers in the book.

The Verisign management team embarked on a new business vision in November 2007 and from that time to late 2011 the company decreased headcount from 5,000 to 1,000, went from 88 worldwide offices to approximately 10, and sold 13 business combinations. The team took the capital generated from this process and rewarded shareholders with attractive share buybacks and dividends. They bought back $1.3 billion in stock in 2008, $260 million in 2009, $449 million in 2010 and $550 million in 2011.

I would like to see the capital allocation done with a more opportunistic methodology but the company certainly has done better on this front then I have seen the vast majority of companies I have observed over the years.


Mr. Thorndike book provides many clear cut examples of managers that blazed their own trails, often in conflict with accepted financial practices of the times. He walks us through these examples and explains how they were able to earn outsized returns for their shareholders. These lessons can be used in your own investing process and will help you when you search for management teams of current companies that have the characteristics detailed in the book. The traits include a willingness to go against conventional wisdom, the ability to be flexible enough to buy stock when it's cheap and do acquisitions only when their return expectations can be attained.

This quote (page ix) contains the main theme of the book and it's something that most investors miss:

"The metrics that the press usually focuses on is growth in revenues and profits. It's the increase in a company's per share value (author italics), however, not growth in sales or earnings or employees, that offers the ultimate barometer of a CEO's greatness."

Thursday, 12 April 2012 00:00

Howard Marks: Speech Notes & Book Review

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Brief Notes From Howard Marks' Speech at 2012 Indy CFA Investment Forum (March 2012)

I was able to attend a conference just recently in my home city of Indianapolis at which Mr. Marks was a speaker. Not only is he an accomplished writer but he is a gifted public speaker (and somewhat of a jokester as I will reveal a little later in the blog).

Key Takeaways (the following is from my notes and is not a transcript):

Fundamentals, psychology, and technicals influence asset prices. Since 2009 fundamentals remained iffy, psychology has rebounded significantly, macro picture as scary as he has ever seen it.

Everyone was dependant on capital markets and as a result we won't see the same growth as credit won't be as available as in the past.

Europe: very cloudy, quite scary, Needs (or is working from) a new instruction manual

Risk: Alternative history concept learned from Taleb. Look at what could have happened. Think about possibility that things other than what you expect will happen.

Investing is when events collide with an investment portfolio. Offense vs. Defense decisions are the most important.

What were keys to success in great recession?

  • · You needed the nerve to invest
  • · You didn't need patience. Discernment, risk control, and selectivity did work in that particular period

Current stance:

  • · Move forward but with caution
  • · Lots of things wrong with the world but have recovery with modest expectations

It's not quality that's important it's the price. (My comment - but when quality can be purchased at the right price it can lead to great results)

What will make sure you do okay if world doesn't go your way? Margin of Safety.




On a more personal level I did miss a conversation Mr. Marks was having in the hallway before his presentation but I was able to talk to him briefly before lunch (no earth shattering revelations) and I walked away very impressed. In fact I wish I had heard his IPO road show presentation before this encounter because I would have told him how impressed I was with his firms accounting standards. I don't know Mr. Marks personally but using that conservative standard really makes him, and his firm, a class act in my book.

He also has a sense of humor. Here is the first sentence he wrote when he signed my copy of his book, Memo to Oaktree Clients: "Don't sell this book on eBay. You'll never get another one. "Don't worry Mr. Marks I would never sell it (well maybe if a high quality company with a fifty foot moat stocked with crocodiles was selling at ones times earnings).

Book Review: The Most Important Thing Illuminated Edition

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It's my pleasure to announce that Howard Marks will be releasing a new copy of his book! The new edition is titled: The Most Important Thing Illuminated. This new version, (my understanding is that it will be available in a digital version only), is annotated by Chris Davis, Joel Greenblatt, Paul Johnson, and Seth Klarman. It also includes a new chapter: Reasonable Expectations.

I have to say I was very excited to learn that this new edition was going to be released. As I mentioned in a previous entry on this blog I found the first edition of his book to be a seminal investing work, one that deserves to be on the same shelf as The Intelligent Investor, Security Analysis, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, and the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letters.

I was not disappointed when I read my review copy. I found that the annotated comments highlighted important sections in the text while also providing additional compelling perspectives but yet didn't get in the way of the flow of the book.

Don't just take my word on this, here are a few examples:

p. 58: Howard Marks: Understanding uncertainly: Dimson's formulation reminds us of a very simple concept: that many things are possible in the future. We can't know which of the possibilities will occur, and this uncertainty contributes to the challenge of investing. "Single scenario" investors ignore this fact, oversimplify the task, and need fortuitous outcomes to produce good results.

p. 104:Seth Klarman: Even the best investors judge themselves on the basis of return. It would be hard to evaluate yourself on risk, since risk cannot be measured. Apparently, the risk-averse managers of this endowment were disappointed with their relative returns even though their risk adjusted performance was likely excellent, as borne out by their performance over the following three years. This highlights just how hard it is to maintain conviction over the long run when short-term performance is considered poor.

Please allow me to make one additional comment on the annotations before I discuss the new chapter. I was not familiar with Mr. Johnson before reading his collection of annotations in the book but I found them insightful and thought provoking. I wish my college career had included being a student in his classes. You can find more information on him at this site:

The new chapter is Reasonable Expectations. This chapter develops the theme that investors need to keep their expectations grounded in reality to guard themselves from overreaching and thus taking on far more risk than is reasonable. Mr. Marks cautions his readers that one can never know when the exact right time to make a purchase is. Focus on buying it when its trading at below your estimate of value with the understanding that if its gets cheaper you will buy more as the price declines. The point is not to become despondent if the stock continues to decline after your purchase as it's almost impossible, and not reasonable, to expect to be able to catch the absolute button.

Here is a quote from this chapter in which Mr. Marks is telling his readers how an investor should have been thinking in the dark period of 2007-2009

"I need 8 percent. I'd be glad to earn 10 percent instead. Twelve percent would be even better. But I won't try for more than that, because doing so would entail risks I'm just not willing to bear. I don't need 20 percent."

I find that comment particularly interesting when you consider that Mr. Buffett has spoken on the record many times that he looks for investments that can earn him 15%.

In conclusion I certainly think the chapter is a valuable addition to the book. This new material, along with the added annotations, make the new edition a worthwhile purchase. All in all this new edition does the nearly impossible, it takes an already classic text and makes it an even more indispensable tool for investors!

Templeton's Way with Money: Strategies and Philosophy of a Legendary Investor Book Review

Amazon Kindle: Link

Amazon: Link

John Templeton is a legend in the investment business though I think to the current generation his investment insight is not nearly as well studied as are Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett.

In my studies of successful investors and their investment approaches one common theme shines through. The theme is that they follow their own path and it's evident from the book that Mr. Templeton also refused to follow conventional investment wisdom. He preached against excess diversification, he went in search of bargain securities around the world (an approach not common at the time) and he refused to categorize himself as a growth or a value investor. He believed that growth is just a component that needs to accounted for in the valuation equation.

Why should you buy this book? It contains valuable information such as his investment principles, extracts from his letters to shareholders. The authors, one of whom worked for Mr. Templeton, help the reader develop a deeper understanding of the material by providing comments and insights as appropriate.

Besides his refusing to blindly accept conventional investment wisdom one of the other most valuable insights that an individual investor can learn from this book, in my opinion, is his policy concerning investment allocation. He understood that one of the great difficulties in investing is being able to buy when the market is declining so he developed a system that automatically invested more in stocks as they declined in market downturns (and did reverse when the market was rising) which helped make sure his clients were able to take advantage of stocks when they were cheap.

A worthy edition to read, study, and include in your investment library.

Thursday, 09 February 2012 00:00

Buy High and Sell Higher?

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Blog Ideas

I thought I'd say a few things that have caught my attention over the past few months. I have a new academic study to share, a few books to mention and some news on my own upcoming new edition of The Focus Investor. I just received the annotated copy of it back from the editor the other day. Though we are one step closer to getting in everyone's hands it still needs to be revised, again. On to the rest of the blog!

Thinking, Fast and Slow: A Fascinating Book

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Thinking, Fast and Slow

Amazon Kindle Link:
Thinking, Fast and Slow

This probably won't surprise many regular readers of this blog (yes I know that I should be posting more regularly in order to actually have regular readers!) but I have a new book to recommend:Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman, a recipient of the Noble Prize in Economic Sciences.

The marketing blurb from the book:

"In the highly anticipated Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman takes us on a groundbreaking tour of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think. System 1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. Kahneman exposes the extraordinary capabilitiesand also the faults and biasesof fast thinking, and reveals the pervasive influence of intuitive impressions on our thoughts and behavior. The impact of loss aversion and overconfidence on corporate strategies, the difficulties of predicting what will make us happy in the future, the challenges of properly framing risks at work and at home, the profound effect of cognitive biases on everything from playing the stock market to planning the next vacationeach of these can be understood only by knowing how the two systems work together to shape our judgments and decisions.

Engaging the reader in a lively conversation about how we think, Kahneman reveals where we can and cannot trust our intuitions and how we can tap into the benefits of slow thinking. He offers practical and enlightening insights into how choices are made in both our business and our personal livesand how we can use different techniques to guard against the mental glitches that often get us into trouble. Thinking, Fast and Slow will transform the way you think about thinking."

Dr. Kahneman covers all the bases that an investor should think about when studying how their our actions and though processes can influence their decision making in life and investing. Here is one quote that I found very informative for focus investors:

pages 339-340

"Closely following daily fluctuations is a losing proposition, because the pain of the frequent small losses exceeds the pleasure of the equally frequent small gains. ...the deliberate avoidance of exposure to short-term outcomes improves the quality of both decisions and outcomes. The typical short-term reaction to bad news is increased loss aversion. Investors who get aggregated feedback receive such news much less often and are likely to be less risk averse and to end up richer. You are less prone to useless churning of your portfolio if you don't know how every stock in it is doing every day..."

We all understand one of the enemies of the focus investor is the inability to sit on our rumps for long periods of time while we wait for opportunity to come to us and this is just further confirmation.

This is just a tiny portion of the wisdom in the book and I heartily recommend it to all of my readers even if you have read many books about investment psychology.


Cramer Study

In case you didn't know I'm not the only person who has issues with Jim Cramer and his television show. C<span">ramer and Jason Zweig, a writer for the WSJ, also have quite a history of bantering back and forth. One episode between them dates back to 2008 and here is how the Mad Money site frames the dispute:

"Cramer criticized Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Zweig after he wrote an article this weekend that said buy and hold is solid investment strategy and took a shot at TV pundits who recommend trading in and out of stocks. Cramer explained that his strategy is to buy and do homework, not buy and hold. He reminded investors that buy and holders got slaughtered during the dot-com bust. Cramer took even more issue with Zweig's statement that buying stocks down 50% is a good investment. He pointed out that investors who bought into National City (NCC), Washington Mutual (WM), General Motors (GM) Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) after they dropped 50% are now down even more. Cramer said that savvy investor should do one hour per week of homework on any stock they invest in - if they don't have time than they should hand it off to a professional, and do their homework on the guy in running the fund. He told investors to remain involved in their portfolios. "The results are completely worth the effort," he said."

(Link to full article:

The idea that Buy and Hold is dead as an investment stratedgy seems to be a theme for this blog post as it is discussed here and in a later part of this blog. Trust me Buy and Hold is alive and well if its properly conducted. Jason Zweig seems to have the last laugh in this argument with Cramer though as this new research article points out in his January 28, 2012 tweet:

says new study: to make money, short jim cramer's "buys," ignore his "sells"

I think its worth a read.


A New Templeton Book

Amazon Link:

Templeton's Way with Money: Strategies and Philosophy of a Legendary Investor by Jonathan Davis and AlasdairNairn

This book looks quite interesting as it is written by two investment professionals with one, Sandy Nairn, having worked with Mr. Templeton for ten years. They believe that their prospective will offer fresh insights into his investment approach. The authors also advise that they have the benefit of having new material to draw from which includes letters to clients and investment holding data that has not been previously published.

James Montier, an author and investment manager that I respect, wrote this blurb:

"Anyone calling themselves an investor should read this book. It is a treasure trove packed with a wonderful combination of Sir John's collected wisdom on the enduring power of the value-based contrarian approach and the authors' fresh insights into both Sir John's methods and their application in today's investment opportunity set."

I think the book looks quite interesting and have preordered it. I also intend to follow up with a full review when the book is released.


Book to Avoid: Buy High, Sell Higher?

Buy High Sell Higher by Joe Terranova

I was recently in my local library ordering articles for background research on a new chapter of The Focus Investor book when I stopped by the investment section and one title jumped out at me: "Buy High and Sell Higher" with a further blurb on its cover that stated "Why buy-and-hold is dead..." Which are both sentiments that I disagree with but thinking that its worthwhile on occasion to see the counter arguments to ideas that you believe in I checked out the book.

In the prologue he gives one good piece of advice when he states that one principle of investing is that you should never put yourself in a position that you have to sell at an inappropriate time. He follows up with a piece of horrible investment advice. On page 12: "The new normal is characterized by fear and uncertainty, and not just for retail investors. New times demand new tactics: welcome to buying high and seller higher."

He goes on to talk about how this strategy would have failed if they would have invested in the S&P 500 in 2000 and held onto those shares until 2010. He also uses Microsoft as an example by saying if you had purchased the stock in 2000 and held onto it until 2010 would have been a "losing proposition in the New Normal". The problem is that he never takes into consideration the valuation of Microsoft in 2000 and how the high price paid versus earnings would be a large of the reason why the company stock (versus its actual business performance) had under performed over this period. The company in this case performed well but the stock didn't in large part because of the unrealistic expectations of those who initially overpaid.

He goes on to discourage day trading but then goes onto to say that you should be "trading around positions and shifting allocations six to eight times a year". His advice is to invest with confidence, on other words investing in "...stocks that the market likes: stocks with momentum, stocks that are outperforming the average benchmark indexes like the S&amp;P 500, and more specifically, stocks that are outperforming other stocks in the same sector". (page 15) Notice how he never once mentions valuations, never once talks about them as businesses.

He further advises investors not to buy when the stock price is low (he calls this the falling knife method of investing) because "when you buy a stock that is consistently making new lows or has just made a 52-week low, you have no point of reference to tell you what to do with that stock". He goes on to state his belief that no investor has any idea of how far the security could fall so they can have no idea when they should sell. Once again his mistake is not taking into account the value of the business and trying to determine the reason for the drop versus the long-term picture of the business. If there is a disconnect, i.e. the company is facing short-term headwinds but with a favorable long-term horizon, this can present a compelling investment opportunity.

He reserves his thoughts on buy on hold on page 48... " became a classic buy-and-hold asset from 2000 to 2010... Just because buy-and-hold has been revealed to be a flawed investment strategy in general during the last decade does not mean that there were not a few assets that could be bought and kept without experiencing significant pullbacks, and gold was one of them." So he appears to be saying that buy-and-hold can work but I doubt he was recommending gold to his client between 2000-2006. So it seems he is telling us buy-and-hold is dead except for those assets/investments that held their value over the last decade and which are now quite obvious to spot with the aid of hindsight.

In the conclusion of his book (page 233-234) he advises investors not to invest like Buffett mainly because he thinks holding stocks forever is something that many investors "can't afford to invest the way he does... no one should invest like Buffett." He continues this discussion by mentioning that in 2008 Buffett purchased a big slug of GoldmanSachs preferred stocks and used it as an example of how investors simple can't invest like Buffett. What he neglects is what Buffett has spent years teaching about investing via his annual report, interviews, and his annual meeting. You must look for companies that you can understand , companies that possess competitive advantages, and that are selling for below you estimate of intrinsic value. Individual investors are certainly able to make these kinds of investments if they spend time learning the investment process, a process that has been followed successfully by value investors for generations. In fact the book provides us with some measure of hope as people who follow the ideas advocated in this book help to generate investment possibilities that we can take advantage of.

In the final analysis the book advocates an investment approach dependent on gut feelings and frequent trading with a fatal full in that no thought is given concerning the companies long-term fundamentals and valuation. My suggestion would be to forget his motto: Buy High, Sell Higher and instead remember this motto: Buy Below Intrinsic Value, Sell Above Intrinsic Value. Although the book does contains a few nuggets of investment wisdom the overall message is one to that I think all investors would do well to avoid. leave the speculative investing to the speculators.

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